Review of Susan Trevaskes, Policing Serious Crime in China: From 'Strike Hard' to 'Kill Fewer' by Jianhua Xu
BOOK REVIEW
Review of Susan Trevaskes, Policing Serious Crime
in China: From 'Strike Hard' to 'Kill Fewer'
Oxon: Routledge, 2010.
ISBN: 9780415564472, 240 pages, $125.00 (hardcover)
Jianhua Xu
Received: 8 January 2012 /Accepted: 31 January 2012 /
Published online: 28 February 2012
# The Author(s) 2012. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
The past three decades have witnessed great transformations in all aspects of Chinese
society. As the most populous nation and the second largest economy in the world, China’s
experience of crime and the government’s way of handling crime provide unprecedented
opportunities for social scientists in general and criminologists in particular to accumulate
knowledge and develop theories. The increasing crime rates caused by the rapid process of
industrialization, urbanization, and modernization in China provide fascinating opportunities
for criminological research. However, existing criminology literature, both within Chinese
academia and in the English world, is still underdeveloped. Susan Trevaskes’ book Policing
Serious Crime in China: From 'Strike Hard' to 'Kill Fewer'’ is an important and timely
contribution to the field.
In this book, Trevaskes skillfully examines the politics, practice, procedures, and
public perceptions of yanda anti-crime campaigns in the first 25 years of the post-1978
reform period. Trevaskes develops the concept of campaign policing and justice in China
in order to describe the Chinese criminal justice practice to punish criminals “harshly and
swiftly” in response to an increasing crime rate since the start of its economic reform in
the 1980s.
According to Trevaskes’ analysis, the anti-crime campaigns take two forms depending on
the scale. One is a nationwide strike hard (yanda) campaign, which can last up to three years
and target a variety of crimes; the other is “specialized struggle” (zhuanxiang douzheng),
which uses “strike hard” policy to target a specific category of crime and lasts for a relatively
short period of time, usually three to six months. Campaign justice becomes the most typical
response by the Chinese Party-state to deal with crime. Since 1983, there has been no single
year without a yanda campaign or “specialized struggle” in China. During campaigns, three
agencies of criminal justice—the police, the procuratorate, and the court—make a concen-
trated effort over a specified time period to attack targeted crimes “severely and swiftly”.
Due process is often neglected, while abuse of human rights and confession by torture
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become common practice. As the author rightfully points out, the rationale for campaign
justice is order-stability, not human rights (p.1).
The author particularly focuses on the political culture that shapes the rise and fall of
the campaign justice. She convincingly argues that the culture of campaign justice is
based on the Maoist ideology of political struggle (p.2). Facing the outbreaks of serious
crimes in the early 1980s, the Party-state resorts to its familiar way of handling social
problems: campaigns (p.75). The author argues that campaigns become vehicles
through which the yanda policy made by the central government is disseminated and
realized at the local level. While yanda’s parentage is the mass movement of the 1950s,
the son of yanda is “specialized struggle”.
However, campaign justice started to wane in the first years of twenty-first century.
The effectiveness of the 2001–2003 national yanda campaigns, for instance, came
under serious questioning. Many local and even national top police officials publicly
criticized the abuse of human rights and the ineffectiveness of controlling of crime
through these campaigns. Some scholars even argued that yanda actually contributes to
increasing, rather than decreasing, crime rates (p.79). In 2003, the Party-state’s rhetoric
started to emphasize that yanda should be “regularized” in everyday police practice.
The author argues that the subtle shift in terminology from an emphasis on yanda as a
discrete “political struggle” to one of “regularization” marks a turning-point of campaign
justice’s fall.
Indeed, as the author argues, Chinese criminal justice proves to be pretty harsh.
Although the actual number sentenced to the death penalty still remains a state secret,
the general estimation is that more people are executed for crime in China each year than
in the rest of world combined. In recent years, Chinese authority’s response to crime is
under reform and has become less punitive. In 2007, the Supreme People’s Court
reclaimed its review rights on all death penalty cases from Higher People’s Court, which
incurred a sharp reduction of death penalty, a one-half and even two-thirds decline as
some Chinese legal scholars have estimated. The author has rightfully summarized this
trend as “from 'strike hard' to 'kill fewer'.”
However, I am not as optimistic as the author regarding her speculation that the
future of campaign justice will “most probably disappear in the decade ahead”
(p.178). If we agree with the author’s judgment that “strike hard” is fundamentally
political, and political deployment is much more important than fighting crime, then
under the current Party-state’s top priority of “maintaining social stability”, the anti-
crime campaigns could still be utilized by the government to remind people that
social order is still in their control. The high profile anti-organized crime campaign in
Chongqing since 2009 is a good example in that regard. The optimistic judgment on
the end of campaign justice might be related to the author’s over-reliance on
secondhand data from newspapers and the Party-state’s official discourse (e.g., Xiao
Yang’s words (p.176) and official crime statistics on the stabilization of the crime
situation).
In addition, to some extent, chapters 5 and 6 are not well integrated with the whole book.
While the book’s theme is “policing serious crime”, these two chapters are more about the
situation of drugs and organized crimes rather than how the Party-state polices and manages
them. As the author herself points out, “the following two chapters put the spotlight on crime
rather than on crime control” (p.164). Despite this admission, these chapters remain only
loosely tied to the central thesis of the book.
The author raises other issues that are also difficult to agree with. Trevaskes argues that
2003 marked the turning-point from the “strike hard” to “kill fewer” campaigns, as the
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Party-state started to emphasize “regularization” of yanda in everyday police practice.
However, 2007 might indicate a much clearer turning-point, as the Supreme People’s Court’s
reclaiming of review power on the death penalty caused a dramatic decline in those
sentenced to the death penalty, killing fewer. Moreover, I hesitate to agree with the author’s
observation that “police statistics in the early 1980s were much more accurate than they are
today” (p.3).
Nevertheless, this book is an important contribution to Chinese criminology. It will also
be of interest to readers in China studies, sociology, and political science in general.
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